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The Prefaces to Pseudo-Alexander of  
Aphrodisias’ Medical Puzzles and Natural 
Problems Books 1 and 2: Greek Text, 
Translation, and Interpretation 
Michiel Meeusen, Katerina Oikonomopoulou, Luigi Silvano 
HE COLLECTION of Medical Puzzles and Natural Problems 
( Ἰατρικῶν ἀπορηµάτων καὶ φυσικῶν προβληµάτων) has 
been transmitted to us under the name of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, though its authorship is today contested on 
grounds of both philosophical background and date.1 The 
collection comprises an assortment of medical-naturalist prob-
lems, divided into two books (of 152 and 76 problems, respec-
tively, on which see section 2 below). Finding its model in the 
pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, the collection formed an integral 
 
1 See, e.g., H. Flashar, “Beiträge zu spätantiken Hippokratesdeutung,” 
Hermes 90 (1962) 402–418, at 409 n.3, who rejects Alexander’s authorship 
on the basis of the Medical Puzzles’ “materialistische Auffassung von der 
Seele.” For speculation about the historical authorship of the Medical Puzzles 
see R. W. Sharples, “Implications of the New Alexander of Aphrodisias 
Inscription,” BICS 48 (2005) 47–56, at 53–56, who, on the basis of epi-
graphical evidence, suggests attributing the work (and part of the Supple-
mentary Problems and the On Fevers) to the Commentator’s father, whose name 
was also Alexander and who was also a philosopher. For an alternative 
theory, identifying the author with Alexander of Damascus (often confused 
with Alexander of Aphrodisias) see M. Meeusen, “Ps.-Alexander of Aphro-
disias on Unsayable Properties in Medical Puzzles and Natural Problems,” in M. 
Meeusen (ed.), Ancient Greek Medicine in Questions and Answers: Diagnostics, Didac-
tics, Dialectics (Leiden 2020) 80–107, at 101–103. 
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part of a vibrant tradition of medical-naturalist problemata 
literature in the Graeco-Roman imperial era, which included 
works such as Plutarch’s Naturales Quaestiones, the so-called Sup-
plementa Problematorum, and the iatrosophist Cassius’ Medical 
Problems.2 Its significance lies not only in the testimony to the 
role problemata played to the transmission of medical and 
natural scientific knowledge during the Roman Empire, but 
also in the fact that, almost uniquely for ancient medical-
naturalist problemata-literature, both its books are introduced by 
lengthy prefaces, which yield rich insights into the theory and 
intellectual aims of medical-naturalist problemata in this period. 
Systematic study of these prefaces has only recently begun.3 A 
 
2 On Plutarch’s Quaest.Nat. see M. Meeusen and F. Pontani, Plutarque, 
Oeuvres Morales XIII.1 Traité 59 (Questions Naturelles) (Paris 2018); on the 
Suppl.Probl. see S. Kapetanaki and R. W. Sharples, Pseudo-Aristoteles (pseudo-
Alexander), Supplementa Problematorum (Berlin 2006); on the iatrosophist Cassius 
see A. Garzya and R. Masullo, I Problemi di Cassio Iatrosofista (Naples 2004). 
For recent work on the Aristotelian Problemata see especially B. Centrone 
(ed.), Studi sui Problemata Physica aristotelici (Naples 2011); R. Mayhew, Aristotle, 
Problems I–II (Cambridge [Mass.] 2011); R. Mayhew (ed.), The Aristotelian 
Problemata Physica: Philosophical and Scientific Investigations (Leiden 2015). 
3 See Flashar, Hermes 90 (1962) 402–418, focusing on parallels with the 
preface of the Suppl.Probl. (on which see K. Oikonomopoulou, “Author(s) 
and Reader(s) in the Supplementary Problems (Supplementa Problematorum),” in 
Ancient Greek Medicine in Questions and Answers 55–79). For recent work on the 
text and its prefaces see M. Meeusen, “An Interpretation of the Preface to 
Medical Puzzles and Natural Problems 1 by Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias in 
Light of Medical Education,” in P. Bouras-Vallianatos et al. (eds.), Greek 
Medical Literature and its Readers. From Hippocrates to Islam and Byzantium (Lon-
don 2018) 94–109, “Unknowable Questions and Paradoxography in Ps.-
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Medical Puzzles and Natural Questions,” in G. 
Kazantzidis (ed.), Medicine and Paradoxography in the Ancient World (Berlin 2019) 
199–214, and in Ancient Greek Medicine in Questions and Answers 88–107; L. 
Silvano, “Un’edizione da rifare: i Problemata dello Pseudo-Alessandro di 
Afrodisia,” Philologia Antiqua 10 (2017) 19–29, “La luna (piena?) e la decom-
posizione della carne: nota a Pseudo-Alessandro di Afrodisia, Probl. 1, 66 
Ideler,” Revue des Études Tardo-antiques 7 (2017/8) 29–46, and “Studiare la 
natura per problemi: il proemio al primo libro dei Dubbi medici e problemi fisici 
dello Pseudo-Alessandro di Afrodisia,” SemRom N.S. 7 (2018) 89–106. 
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key reason for the lack of interest in them has been the absence 
of a reliable critical edition and translation of the work as a 
whole: the Greek text that we currently possess is that of the 
Aldine edition,4 republished by Ideler with very few variants, in 
the first volume of his Physici et Medici Graeci Minores (Berlin 
1841; available in the on-line TLG),5 but it contains many mis-
takes and inconsistencies. 
Our objective in the present article is to examine the Medical 
Puzzles’ two prefaces, with a view to assessing the clues they can 
provide as to the aims of the collection as a whole. To this end, 
we discuss their relationship to each other and their role in the 
respective books to which they belong. Further, we shed light 
on their intellectual background and method of posing and 
solving medical problems. To facilitate the reader’s access to 
the prefaces’ content, we append an English translation to the 
revised Greek text, which is based on direct examination of the 
manuscript evidence by Luigi Silvano.6 
1. Greek text and English translation of the prefaces 
A complete census of the manuscript evidence is still a de-
sideratum. The present edition is based on a fresh collation of a 
representative group of manuscripts, listed below with their 
sigla. They can be divided into two families: the first, and pos-
sibly closer to the archetype, has in M1 and M2 its most author-
 
4 [Aldus Manutius], Theophrasti de historia plantarum […], Alexandri 
Aphrodisiensis problematum, libri duo […], Aristotelis mechanicorum […] Eiusdem 
metaphysicorum […] Theophrasti  metaphysicorum liber unus (Venice 1497; ISTC 
nr. ia00959000). 
5 He purportedly had access to the preparatory notes assembled by 
Friedrich Reinhold Dietz, who traveled between 1826 and 1833 to various 
libraries in England, France, Italy, and Spain with the task of viewing and 
collating manuscripts that contained the works of ancient Greek and Arab 
doctors. 
6 We would also like to thank Carl-Gustav Lindqvist (Ph.D. candidate at 
Göteborg University), who provided useful manuscript readings during an 
earlier version of this article. Our goal is to pursue more extensive study of 
the collection as a whole in the future. 
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itative representatives; the second includes MSS. LM4Mu3P4, 
which share several interpolations and rephrasings. The edition 
tacitly corrects several misprints and omissions in Ideler’s 1841 
edition. 
 
B = Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 3635 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–2v (praef. 
I), 33v–34r (praef. II) 
L = London, British Library, Harley 6295 (s. XV/2), ff. 1r–2r (praef. 
I; praef. II vacat) 
M1 = Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Marc.gr. IV 58 (coll. 
1206, s. XIII ex.), ff. 153r–154v (praef. I), 178v–179r (praef. II) 
(this was the exemplar of the Aldine edition) 
M2 = Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Marc.gr. Z. 521 (coll. 
316, s. XIII med.), ff. 73v–74r (praef. I), 84r–v (praef. II) 
M4 = Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Marc.gr. Z. 259 (coll. 
892, s. XIV med.), ff. 1r–2r (praef. I), 18v–19r (praef. II) 
M5 = Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Marc.gr. Z. 260 (coll. 
407, s. XV med.), ff. 1r–3r (praef. I), 45r–46r (praef. II) 
Mu2 = Modena, Biblioteca Estense Universitaria, gr. 210 Puntoni (α 
V 6.12, s. XVI), ff. 299v–301r (praef. I), 326v–327r (praef. II) 
Mu3 = Modena, Biblioteca Estense Universitaria, gr. 115 Puntoni (α 
P 5.17, s. XV), ff. 52r–v (praef. I), 56v–57r (praef. II) 
P4 = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Coislin 332 (s. XV), ff. 
1r–2v (praef. I), 32v–33v (praef. II) 
P8 = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 2048 (s. XV), ff. 1r–
3r (praef. I), 40r–41r (praef. II) 
P11 = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 1893 (s. XVI), ff. 
153r–154v (praef. I), 180r–181r (praef. II) 
V2b = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal.gr. 237 
(s. XIV), ff. 161r–163r (praef. I; praef. II vacat) 
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Preface 1, Greek text7 
Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀφροδισιέως ἰατρικῶν ἀπορηµάτων καὶ φυσικῶν 
προβληµάτων τὸ Α 
[1] Τῶν προβληµάτων τὰ µὲν αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ πιστὰ καὶ γνώριµα, 
πάσης ἀµφιβολίας καὶ ζητήσεως ἄγευστα. [2] Τίς γάρ, οἶµαι, νοῦν 
ἔχων ἀπορήσειε, τίνος ἕνεκεν ἡ φύσις τοῖς πτηνοῖς ἐδωρήσατο πτερά 
(πᾶς γὰρ συνετὸς εἴποι ἄν, ὅτι θάλψεως χάριν ἀνθ᾿ ἱµατίων µὲν πρῶ-
τον περιέβαλε, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλους ἕνεκεν) πεζοῖς δὲ ζῴοις τρίχας, 
ἑρπετοῖς δὲ φολίδας, ἐνύδροις δὲ λεπίδας, ἤ ὄστρακα, καθάπερ τὰ 
ὀστρακόδερµα προσαγορευόµενα; Καὶ πάλιν διὰ τί τοῖς µὲν κέρατα, 
τοῖς δὲ κέντρα, τοῖς δὲ ὀξεῖς ὄνυχας ἢ ῥάµφη ἤ τι τοιοῦτον; Πρὸς 
ἄµυναν τῶν ἀδικούντων ὥσπερ φυσικοῖς δόρασιν ἠσφαλίσατο 
ταῦτα. [3] Καρποὺς δὲ πάντας καὶ σπέρµατα πρὸς γένεσιν καὶ 
διαδοχὴν τοῦ γένους τεκτηναµένη ἡ φύσις, λέπεσιν ἢ σώµασί τισιν 
ὑγροῖς ἢ ξυλώδεσιν ἢ δέρµασιν ὁµοίως ἠσφαλίσατο, καθάπερ ἐν 
κιβωτῷ τούτους ἀποκρύψασα πρὸς ἀποφυγὴν κρύους ἢ θάλπους ἢ 
ζῴων τινῶν ἀδικούντων· καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ περίβληµα παντελῶς 
ἀχρεῖον οὐ κατέλειψεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τροφὴν παρεσκεύασεν. [4] αὐτὰ 
δὲ τὰ φυτὰ φύλλοις µὲν καὶ φλοιῷ καὶ τοῖς ὁµοίοις ἠµφίασεν ἀντὶ 
πτερῶν ἢ τριχῶν· προῄδει γὰρ ὡς ἄµετρος ψύξις ἢ θερµότης ἐδύνατο 
λυµαίνεσθαι ταῦτα· ἀκάνθαις δὲ καθώπλισεν ἀντὶ βελῶν διὰ τὴν 
ἀπὸ τῶν ζῴων φθοράν. [5] Ἄνθεσι δὲ ποικίλοις ἐστεφάνωσε ταῦτα 
κόσµου καὶ κάλλους ἕνεκεν, καὶ πάλιν ὥσπερ κήρυκας προµηνύ-
οντας τὴν τῶν καρπῶν προκύπτουσαν γένεσιν. [6] Ὅσοι µὲν τοιαῦτα 
γνωστὰ καὶ σαφῆ προτείνουσιν, ἄντικρυς δέονται νοῦ· ὅσοι δὲ 
 
7 We omit to record all the variae lectiones of the manuscripts. The most 
significant are discussed in the notes appended to the translation; here is a 
selection of some more (β means the consensus codicum BLM4Mu3P4): Tit. 
Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀφροδισιέως ἰατρικῶν ἀπορηµάτων καὶ φυσικῶν προβληµάτων 
(add. τὸ Α M1)] Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀφροδισέως ἐπί τισι φυσικαῖς ἀπορίαις λύσεις β 
(βιβλίον ᾶον add. L : προοίµιον add. P4) Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀφροδισιέως φυσικαὶ 
ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις· προοίµιον· τόµος πρῶτος Mu3 : om. V2b; | §6 προτείνουσιν] 
προτείνουσιν εἰς λύσιν β (praeter LM4)Mu2P8V2b; | §6 παραπλήσια] 
παραπλήσια ἀπειθοῦσι β; | §6 ἔνοχοι] ταῦτα τοίνυν αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ γνώριµα 
add. β ; | §16 χρησάµενος] ἑπόµενος β | §16 τῆς αἰτίας om. β, secl. Sylburg. 
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διχοστατοῦσιν, εἰ συµφύτως τῷ πυρὶ σύνεστιν ἡ θερµότης, ἁπτικῆς 
αἰσθήσεώς εἰσιν ἐνδεεῖς. ὅσοι δέ, πότερον φύσις καὶ λόγος προνοητι-
κὸς προµηθεύεται τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, τὴν τάξιν, τὴν κίνησιν, 
τὴν θέσιν, τὴν διάπλασιν, τὰς χρόας, τὰ παραπλήσια, κολάσεως 
τυγχάνουσιν ἔνοχοι. 
[7] Τὰ δὲ ἄλυτα παντελῶς ἐστι θεῷ µόνῳ γνώριµα, τῷ καὶ τὴν 
τούτων οὐσίαν ὑποστήσαντι. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης ἔργον τι µηχανικὸν 
κατασκευάσας οἶδεν αὐτοῦ πάσας τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰς αἰτίας, ἰδιώ-
της δὲ παντελῶς ἄµοιρος τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστιν. [8] Ἄποροι δὲ ζητήσεις 
εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαίδε· τίνος ἕνεκεν οἱ γαργαλιζόµενοι µασχάλας ἢ πέλ-
µατα ἢ πλευρὰς γελῶσιν; Ἢ τίνος χάριν ἀκούοντές τινες µαρµάρων 
παρατριβοµένων ἢ πριζοµένων ἢ τρίζοντος ἢ ῥινουµένου σιδήρου 
τοὺς ὀδόντας εὐθέως ναρκῶσιν; Ἢ διὰ τί τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχρῶν 
ὀπωρῶν προσγινοµένην αἱµωδίαν τοῖς ὀδοῦσιν ἀνδράχνη ψυχρὰ 
πεφυκυῖα θεραπεύει καὶ οὐκέτι τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάµατα, 
ἀλλὰ τὰ ὅµοια; Ἢ διὰ τί λίθος ἡ µαγνῆτις ἕλκει µόνον τὸν σίδηρον, 
ὑπό τε τῶν τούτου ῥινηµάτων ζῳοποιεῖται, ἡ λίθος ἥ τε ἤλεκτρος 
λεγοµένη µόνα τὰ κυρήβια καὶ τὰ κάρφη συνανασπᾷ κολλωµένη 
τούτοις; [9] Καὶ λέων ἀλεκτρυόνα δέδοικε µόνον, ὄρνις δὲ κατοι-
κίδιος ᾠὸν τεκοῦσα τοῖς κάρφεσιν ἑαυτὴν ἀποκαθαίρει πανταχόσε 
τοῦ σώµατος· ὄρτυγές τε σιτοῦνται τὸν ἐλλέβορον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
δηλητήριον ὄντα· ψᾶρες δὲ τὸ κώνειον· ἀσκαµωνία δὲ µᾶλλον χολὴν 
ξανθὴν ἕλκει· κολοκυνθὶς δὲ καὶ ἀγαρικὸν καὶ λευκὸς ἐλλέβορος 
εὐφόρβιόν τε καὶ κόκκος Κνίδιος φλέγµα· µέλας δὲ ἐλλέβορος καὶ 
ἐπίθυµον µέλαιναν χολήν; Τινὲς δὲ ὑπὸ µὲν τῶν καθαιρόντων στεγ-
νοῦνται τὴν κοιλίαν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν στελλόντων καθαίρονται µᾶλλον. 
[10] Καὶ ἄλλος πρὸς τήνδε πλέον ἥδεται τὴν τροφήν, ῥᾷον αὐτὴν 
µεταβάλλων. Οὐδεὶς δὲ καὶ τὴν θαλασσίαν νάρκην ἀγνοεῖ· πῶς διὰ 
τῆς µηρίνθου τὸ σῶµα ναρκοῖ, τρίγλη δὲ κρατουµένη ἀντιπαθεῖ τῇ 
νάρκῃ; [11] Καὶ µυρίων ἄν σοι τοιούτων προκαταβαλοίµην κατά-
λογον, πείρᾳ µόνον γινωσκοµένων, ἃ παρὰ τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἰδιότητες 
ἄρρητοι λέγονται· τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον ἑκάστου προφερόµενον ἄρρητον 
ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἀπόδοσιν τῆς αἰτίας. Κακῶς γὰρ ἔνιοι λύσεις ἀθρόας 
τούτων παραβάλλουσι, ἀπειροτάτας δὲ καὶ ἀπιθάνους. [12] Φασὶ 
γὰρ τὰ καθαρτήρια θερµότητι τοὺς χυµοὺς ἕλκειν, ὅπερ ψεῦδος· ἔδει 
γὰρ πᾶν θερµὸν εἶναι καὶ καθαρτήριον· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ πέπερι θερµὸν 
ὂν οὐχ ἑλκτικόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πεπτικὸν καὶ τονωτικόν, ὡσαύτως δὲ 
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καὶ µαστίχη καὶ ἀλόη. φαµὲν δὲ µὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸν λόγον· πᾶν γὰρ 
καθαρτήριον θερµὸν µὲν τῇ κράσει, κενωτικὸν δὲ τῇ δυνάµει, οὐ πᾶν 
δὲ θερµὸν ἤδη καὶ τὴν δύναµιν καθαρτικόν. Λέγουσι δὲ τὸν στρου-
θοκάµηλον σίδηρον πέττειν, οὐκ ἰδιότητί τινι, µᾶλλον δὲ θερµότητι, 
ὅπερ ἄτοπον· λέων γὰρ τούτου τοῦ ζῴου θερµότερος ὢν οὐ πέττει τὸν 
σίδηρον. Οὐ µόνον δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἐστιν ἰδιώµατα µόνοις, ἀλλ᾿ 
ἤδη καὶ παρὰ φιλοσόφοις καὶ γραµµατικοῖς, πάθη λεγόµενα καὶ 
σεσηµειωµένα ταῖς χρήσεσι. 
[13] Χρὴ τοίνυν προβάλλειν εἰς ζήτησιν τὰ µέσην ἔχοντα χώραν, 
ἀµφίβολά τε πρὸς γνῶσιν, οἷά τε πρὸς λύσιν ὑποπεσεῖν· [14] ὥσπερ 
γὰρ τῶν λεγοµένων τὰ µέν ἐστι ψευδῆ πᾶσι γνωριζόµενα, τὰ δὲ 
πάντῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν κεκτηµένα, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις 
ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων κεκραµένα λεγόµενα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν προ-
βαλλοµένων τὰ µέν ἐστιν εὔδηλα πᾶσι γινωσκόµενα, τὰ δὲ πάντῃ 
κεκρυµµένα λύσιν οὐχ ὑποδεχόµενα, τὰ δὲ µέσην ἔχοντα φύσιν, ὧν 
καὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ποιησόµεθα. 
[15] Λυτέον δὲ πᾶν πρόβληµα ἀπὸ κράσεως, ἢ διαπλάσεως, ἢ 
ἐνεργείας, ἢ συµπαθείας τοῦ ὁµοίου ἢ χρώµατος, ἢ κατὰ ἀπάτην 
αἰσθήσεως, ἢ κατὰ ὁµωνυµίαν, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τῶν 
ἐνεργουσῶν δυνάµεων αὐτοῦ, ἢ καθὸ σκληρότερον ἢ µανώτερον ἢ 
µεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον αὐτό φαµεν, ἢ ἀπὸ χρόνου καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἔθους, ἢ 
οὐσιώδους ἢ κατὰ συµβεβηκός, ἢ τῶν ὁµοίων καθὼς ἐν τοῖς προβλή-
µασιν εὑρήσεις τὰ λεγόµενα. [16] Τούτοις οὖν τοῖς κανόσι χρησά-
µενος πᾶν ἀπορούµενον δυνήσῃ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς αἰτίας ἀγαγεῖν. 
[17] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ µόνον ἀρκεῖσθαι χρὴ τῇ καθόλου µεθόδῳ, ἀλλ᾿ 
ἤδη καὶ τοῖς κατὰ µέρος χειραγωγεῖν τὸν διδασκόµενον, ἀρξόµεθα 
τῶν λύσεων. 
Preface 1, English translation 
The First Book of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Medical Puzzles and 
Natural Problems 
[1] Of problems some [yield solutions which] are straightforwardly 
credible and intelligible, and such that they do not admit doubt or 
investigation. [2] For, I think, which person in their right mind might 
wonder for what purpose nature gave feathers to the birds? For every 
sensible person would say that first of all it put feathers over them 
instead of clothes for the sake of warmth, and that, secondly, it did so 
for the sake of beauty. And [in the same way] to the animals that 
walk [it gave] hairs, to animals that crawl [it gave] scales, to water 
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animals [it gave] scales or shells, as in the case of the so-called 
crustaceans. And again, why [did nature give] to some horns, to 
others stings, to others sharp nails or some such thing? It secured 
them [sc. with these things] as if they were natural spears for the 
purpose of warding off those who could harm them. [3] And all the 
fruits and seeds that nature crafted for the sake of the generation and 
succession of the kind it similarly secured with husks or with some 
kind of wet or woody bodies, or with skins, having concealed them as 
if in a chest for the sake of avoiding cold or heat, or some animals 
that might harm them. And it did not let the cover itself be com-
pletely useless, but made it for the purpose of nourishment. [4] And 
the plants themselves it covered with leaves and bark and the like in-
stead of feathers and hair. For it knew in advance that immeasurable 
cold or heat could destroy them. And it armed them with thorns 
instead of arrows to preserve them from destruction by animals. [5] 
And it wreathed them with colourful flowers for the sake of adorn-
ment and beauty, and (once again) like heralds foretelling the im-
minent birth of the fruits. [6] Those who propose investigation of 
such matters which are well known and clear are outright brainless. 
And those who dispute whether heat is innate in the fire, are de-
prived of the sense of touch.8 Those too [who dispute] whether 
nature and provident logos take care of matters pertaining to gen-
eration and corruption, the order [sc. of the animals’ body parts], the 
movement, the position, the shape, the colours, and the like, require 
 
8 On the ridiculousness of such questions cf., e.g., Theophr. fr.159.10–11 
FHSG (= Procl. In Ti. 35A, II 120 Diehl; see Silvano, SemRom N.S. 7 [2018] 
92 n.14): οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν φυσικῶν πάντων λέγων δεῖν ἡµᾶς ἐπιζητεῖν τὸ διὰ τί· 
γελοῖον γάρ φησιν ἀπορεῖν, διὰ τί καίει τὸ πῦρ καὶ διὰ τί ψύχει ἡ χιών. The 
example that Aristotle in Topics 1.11 gives of problems that require per-
ception is whether snow is white (105a7: οἱ δὲ πότερον ἡ χιὼν λευκὴ ἢ οὒ 
αἰσθήσεως [sc. δέονται]). Our author probably responds to (and rejects) 
Sceptical attitudes towards sensory perception, cf., e.g., Sext. Emp. Math. 
7.368: οὕτω καὶ τὸ πῦρ θερµαίνειν µὲν δύναται, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
θερµὸν εἶναι (Sextus discusses the relationship between sensory perception 
and thought). In line with our author’s intellectual allegiances (see section 3), 
the collocation “innate heat” is common in Aristotle and also in Galenic 
physiology and medicine. 
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[7] The problems which are totally insoluble, on the other hand, 
are known only to god, who laid down their substance. For the 
artisan too who has constructed some mechanical work knows the 
causes of all its actions, while a layperson is totally ignorant of the 
causes. [8] Things of such sort constitute investigations which are 
impossible to solve: why do those who are tickled in the armpits or 
soles or ribs laugh? Or why, when some people hear marbles being 
rubbed against one other, or sawed, or iron that either squeaks or is 
filed, do they immediately gnash their teeth? Or why is it that the 
irritation caused to the teeth by cold fruits is treated by applying 
cooled purslane, and [why is it that] opposites are not in this instance 
treatments for opposites, but the likes [are]? Or why does the mag-
netic stone attract only iron, and the stone is enlivened by iron’s 
shards, while the so-called elektros [i.e. amber] draws only the husks 
and dry stalks, by clinging on to them? [9] And [why too is] the cock 
the only animal the lion fears, while the domestic chicken when she 
has laid an egg cleans her body completely with dry stalks? [Why do] 
the quails eat hellebore, which is poisonous for humans, while the 
starlings eat hemlock? And [why does] scammony attract yellow bile 
more, while the gourd and tree fungi and white hellebore and spurge 
and Cnidian coccus attract the phlegm? And [why do] black helle-
bore and epithymon attract black bile? Some people are dried up in 
their cavities by drugs that purge, and are more purged by drugs that 
are astringent. [10] And some other person is more pleased by this 
nourishment, as he converts it more easily. And there is nobody who 
does not know of the electric ray: how, then, does it numb the body 
through the fishing line?10 But when the red mullet is taken hold of it 
 
9 This tricolon (nous – aisthesis – kolasis) is paralleled in Aristotle’s Topics 
105a3–9, see Meeusen, in Greek Medical Literature 98–99 with n.36, for 
criticism of Flashar’s interpretation according to which κόλασις implies a 
correction of the phrasing of the questions, rather than a correction/punish-
ment of those who ask such questions; according to Silvano, SemRom N.S. 7 
(2018) 102 and n.35, both interpretations seem acceptable. 
10 Cf. Angelo Poliziano’s 1479 translation with the appropriate linea: see 
L. Silvano, “(Pseudo)Alexander of Aphrodisias between the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance: Notes on the Fortuna of the Medical Puzzles and Natural 
Problems,” in P. B. Rossi et al. (eds.), Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance (Turnhout 2021) 117–144, at 130 and n.46. 
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counteracts the electric ray. [11] I could put down for you a list of 
countless such things, known only through experience, which are 
called “unsayable properties” by doctors. For what is proclaimed to 
be the particular property of each is unsayable in respect of pro-
viding an account of the cause. Some wrongly accumulate heaps of 
solutions to these, which are moreover endless11 and improbable. 
[12] For they say that purgative drugs draw the humors by virtue of 
being very warm, which is wrong. For [if this were the case] every 
warm substance should have been purgative as well. In this way 
pepper, though warm, is not capable of drawing, but is digestive and 
strengthening. Similarly with the mastic and the aloe. We say that 
the logic should not be inverted: for every purgative substance is 
warm in terms of its constitution, and depletive in terms of its power; 
but not every warm substance is also depletive in terms of its power. 
And they say that the ostrich concocts iron, not because of some 
property, but because of its heat—which is absurd; for the lion, even 
though it is warmer than this animal, does not concoct iron. 
Properties (idiômata) are found not just in the doctors alone, but also 
in the philosophers and grammarians, called “modifications in form” 
(pathê ) and noted as exceptions by their usage. 
[13] We must then propose for investigation problems that occupy 
a middle ground, are doubtful in respect of knowledge, and of such 
kind that can be subject to a solution. [14] For just as of the things 
that are said some are false and recognized by everybody as such, 
while all those that [possess] the truth have acquired [sc. this truth] 
through proof, and others still are called, one might say, a mixture of 
both, in the same manner, of the things proposed for solution, some 
are apparent and recognized by everybody as such, while all those 
that are hidden do not admit a solution, and still others occupy a 
middle ground, which are the precise ones on which we shall make 
our exposition. 
[15] Every problem must be solved from the constitution, or the 
formation, or the activity, or from affinity towards something similar, 
 
11 Ideler, with M1 and the Aldina, prints εὐφυρωτάτους, which makes no 
sense; the MSS. of the β family read ἀσυµφόρους. Although this provides a 
sound sense, we prefer to opt for Sylburg’s emendation ἀπειροτάτας δέ, 
which we would be inclined to interpret as “impossible to search” or “open 
to innumerable solutions.” 
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or from colour, or according to the deception of our senses, or ac-
cording to the same name, or from the higher or lesser degree of its 
active powers, or to the extent that we call it harder or looser, or 
greater or smaller, or from time and age and custom, or from essence 
or according to the accidents, or the like, as you will find what is said 
in the problems. [16] Having then used these rules you will be able 
to direct every enquiry towards the demonstration of its cause. [17] 
But since we must not be content with the general method alone, but 
also guide the pupil through individual cases, we shall now begin12 
with the solutions. 
Preface 2, Greek text13 
Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀφροδισιέως ἰατρικῶν ἀπορηµάτων καὶ φυσικῶν 
προβληµάτων τὸ β 
[1] Τὸ Ἀσκληπιοῦ δῶρον πασῶν τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον χρειῶν ὑπερ-
ηκοντίσθη κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. Πρὸς γὰρ ἔµψυχον σῶµα καὶ λόγου 
µετέχον φέρει τὸν σκοπόν, οὗ ἡ τήρησις καὶ ἡ εὔκρατος φυλακὴ τὴν 
τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν τεχνῶν ἀρχὴν ὑπεστήσατο, τὰς αἰσθήσεις µὲν 
ὀξύνουσα, διαίτῃ δὲ τὰ µόρια ῥωννύουσα τὰ ὄργανα τῶν εὑρέσεων. 
[2] Αὕτη τὰ µὲν καλῶς προµηθευθέντα φυλάσσει χρηστῶς, τὰ δὲ ἐλ-
λιπῶς κατασκευασθέντα διορθοῦται· σώµατος φροντίζει, ψυχῆς οὐκ 
ἀµελεῖ· φιλοσοφίας γὰρ φέρει τὰ γνωρίσµατα, ἧς τὸ τέλος οἰκείαν 
ἀρχὴν παρεπήξατο· τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας ἐκτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, τὴν γὰρ 
σύνθεσιν τῶν γεγονότων δεξαµένη οἶδε τὸ µέτρον τῶν λειπόντων. [3] 
Τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς θεῖον καὶ µακάριον εὕρεµα, ἔχον ἐν λόγοις τὴν 
ἀκρίβειαν· διὰ τούτων καρπούσθω τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ εἰς ἐπιστήµης 
ἀναγέσθω κανόνα, κἂν γὰρ τέχνην τις τολµήσειε καλεῖν, οὐ διὰ 
ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πάσχουσαν ὕλην. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὴ µὲν καθ’ ἑαυ-
τὴν εἴδους µισθῷ τὸν λόγον φέρουσα τὸν πρὸς ἐπιστήµην βεβαίαν, 
 
12 ἀρξόµεθα: a couple of manuscripts read ἀρξώµεθα (“let us begin”), 
which is likely to be a lectio facilior. 
13 The manuscripts have no major textual discrepancies: most of the variae 
lectiones are either erroneous or adiaphorae. See e.g. the following: Tit. Ἀλεξ-
άνδρου Ἀφροδισιέως ἰατρικῶν ἀπορηµάτων καὶ φυσικῶν προβληµάτων (M1: 
add. […] δεύτερον M2; βιβλίον δεύτερον M5 P11)] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκλογαὶ ἰατρικῶν 
ἀπορηµάτων καὶ φυσικῶν προβληµάτων β (τόµος δεύτερον. προοίµιον add. Mu3 
βι [. .] add. P8); | §3 διαπεφώνητο] διαπεφώνηται β M2, post ὁ λόγος transp. 
Mu2; | §4 αἰτίου] αἰτίας β M2M5Mu2P11. 
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ἀχθεῖσα δὲ πρὸς σῶµα, καὶ ἐνδυσαµένη τὴν ὕλην, γίνεται τέχνη βίᾳ· 
ὥσπερ γὰρ ψυχὴ ὁµολογηθεῖσα µὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων 
ἀθάνατος διὰ τὸ ἀσώµατον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον, ἑτέροις δὲ διαπε-
φώνητο τοὔµπαλιν ὁ λόγος. Φασὶ γὰρ φθαρτὴν αὐτήν, τῷ πάθει βαπ-
τιζοµένην τῆς ὕλης· οὐ πάσχει δὲ ψυχή, ὡς δείξει τὸ προστιθέµενον. 
[4] Οὕτως ἐν σώµατι ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἐν ὕδατι καθαρωτάτῳ ἀκτὶς 
ἡλιακή· οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ᾖ διαυγὲς τὸ ὕδωρ, φέρει τὸ γνώριµον τοῦ σχή-
µατος· ἐὰν δὲ θολωθῇ ἐκ τινος αἰτίου, µεταβάλλεται µὲν αὐτὸ τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ, κρύπτεται δὲ τὸ φανὲν µηδὲν βλαβὲν κατ’ οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν· 
οὕτω πάλιν πολλάκις ἥλιος ἔκρυψεν ἀκτῖνα φαεινήν, νέφους παρεµ-
πεσόντος, µὴ βλαβείσης αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀκηράτου φύσεως. [5] Ὥσπερ 
οὖν ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔγνωµεν, οὕτω νοήσωµεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· αὐτὴ 
γὰρ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν πρώτως ἔχει τὸ βέβαιον, πρώτως ἔχει τὸ ἑδραῖον 
καὶ ἄπτωτον, ἐπιστήµη τυγχάνουσα· κοινωνήσασα δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ καθῃ-
ρέθη τοῦ ἀξιώµατος, τέχνη γεγονυῖα καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἀπωλέσασα. 
Ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον ἀφορᾶν τοῦ συµβεβηκότος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς 
τὸ πρῶτον τῆς ὑπάρξεως. [6] Καὶ ὅσον µὲν πρὸς τὴν ἡµετέραν διά-
νοιαν διειλήφαµεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν ζητουµένων, ὀλίγα 
τινὰ κεφάλαια ἐξ αὐτῶν καρπωσάµενοι, συντελοῦντα δὲ τοῖς αὐτὴν 
µετερχοµένοις. Καὶ µάλιστα τοῖς τὸν λόγον ἀσκοῦσι φέρουσι δὲ τὴν 
ὠφέλειαν οὐ σµικρὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πραγµάτων εὕρεσιν. 
Preface 2, English translation 
The Second Book of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Medical Puzzles and 
Natural Problems 
[1] Of all the necessities that pertain to life, the gift of Asclepius 
has been made to excel in accordance to its worth. For it directs its 
aim to the animate body which partakes of logos. Its [sc. the body’s] 
safeguarding and well-tempered preservation has laid down the 
starting-point of all the other arts, by sharpening the senses on the 
one hand, and by strengthening through regimen the body parts—
the (very) instruments of invention14—on the other. [2] This then [sc. 
 
14 According to Galen, MM (X 163.15 K.), the instruments of every in-
vention are empeiria kai logos, thus experience coming from the senses and 
reason, as in our passage. Cf. also the beginning of Galen’s UP 1.2–4 (III 2–
7 K. = 68–71 M.), where the anatomy of the human hand is praised as 
being instrumental/organic to the expression of human ingenuity in the 
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medicine] effectively safeguards what has been taken care of well, 
and corrects what has been made in a deficient fashion. It is con-
cerned with the body, but does not neglect the soul. For it bears the 
tokens of philosophy, whose end it has set as its own proper be-
ginning: it does not lie outside naturalist contemplation, for because 
it has understood the composition of things that have come to be, it 
knows the measure of the things that remain. [3] This is a truly 
divine and blessed finding, as it derives its fundament from precise 
reasoning. For these reasons let it reap the fruit of praise, and let it be 
elevated to the standard of science, and should anybody venture to 
call it art, [let it be so] not for these reasons, but because of the mat-
ter that is acted upon. This then [sc. medicine], despite the fact that 
by itself and as a reward for its form it involves a process of thought 
that leads to precise science, becomes art by force, because it has 
been carried down to the body, and put on the garb of matter. In the 
same way the soul is commonly asserted by most philosophers to be 
immortal because it is incorporeal and self-moving, but by others the 
argument has been disputed from the contrary perspective. For they 
say that it [sc. the soul] is corruptible, and suffused by the affections 
of matter. But the soul does not suffer affection, as the following 
example will show. [4] Soul is in the body just as a sun-ray is in the 
clearest of water. If therefore the water is transparent, (the ray) car-
ries the characteristic of its familiar appearance. If however the water 
is blurred by some cause, itself it changes in terms of its substance, 
but the ray’s image is hidden, without having suffered harm in terms 
of its proper activity. In this way again the sun many times hides its 
bright ray, when some cloud has come in between, but without its 
pure nature having been harmed. [5] So just as we have decreed 
about the soul, in the same way let us consider on medicine. This by 
itself principally possesses certainty, principally possesses soundness 
and infallibility, since it happens to be a science. But because it deals 
with matter it has been taken down from its honourable position, 
having become an art and lost its certainty.15 But we must not pay 
attention to the secondary issue of the accident, but to the primary 
___ 
form of several technai. 
15 So it is now a stochastic art (like navigation, etc.), cf. K. Ierodiakonou, 
“Alexander of Aphrodisias on Medicine as a Stochastic Art,” Clio Medica 28 
(1995) 473–485. 
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issue of the existence. [6] And we have interspersed [sc. in our book] 
a great many problems for the sake of [exercising] our intellectual 
capacity and not for the practical usefulness of enquiries, having 
gathered only a few characteristic examples from the latter kind. 
These [latter problems] should however suffice for those who pursue 
it [sc. the practical usefulness of enquiries]. And especially for those 
who intend to train their theoretical faculty they [sc. the few practical 
problems] provide no little benefit for the invention of things.16 
2. Content and placement of the two prefaces 
The preface to Book 1 is methodological in character. It 
argues that one must be able to distinguish between three kinds 
of problems: those whose solutions are straightforwardly 
credible and intelligible (πιστὰ καὶ γνώριµα, §1); those that are 
wholly insoluble (ἄλυτα παντελῶς, §7), which, the preface states, 
are known only to god (ἐστι θεῷ µόνῳ γνώριµα, §7); and, finally, 
those that occupy a middle ground (τὰ µέσην ἔχοντα χώραν, §13), 
whose solutions are ambiguous (ἀµφίβολα … πρὸς γνῶσιν, §13). 
At first sight this distinction seems to apply to problems in 
general (it begins with the statement: Τῶν προβληµάτων…, §1), 
yet the context and abundant examples that are provided for 
each category make it clear that the author has specifically 
medical-naturalist problems in mind. Only the third kind of 
problem is deemed suitable for investigation, so the preface 
concludes by issuing some general guidelines for its solution 
(§§15–16). The problems that follow (in the collection’s first 
book) are intended to demonstrate the general method ad-
vocated in the preface. 
The principal concern of the second preface is to defend 
medicine (which is characterised as “the gift of Asclepius,” τὸ 
Ἀσκληπιοῦ δῶρον, §1) as a science. In the first instance med-
icine’s value is defended in terms of its contribution to the 
overall preservation of the animate (ἔµψυχον, §1) body and its 
 
16 For the Empiricists’ concept of εὕρεσις relating to the discovery of rem-
edies by an analogical method based on practice and experience, see H. von 
Staden, “Experiment and Experience in Hellenistic Medicine,” BICS 22 
(1975) 178–199, at 191–192. See also n.14 above. 
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parts, thanks to which all the arts can be practiced.17 Secondly, 
the preface argues that the soul too falls within medicine’s 
domain, insofar as medicine “bears the tokens of philosophy” 
(φιλοσοφίας γὰρ φέρει τὰ γνωρίσµατα, §2). As the preface goes on 
to explain, medicine has been downgraded from the status of a 
science to that of an art, owing to its preoccupation with 
changeable matter, but is in fact a science, whose logos prin-
cipally (πρώτως, §5) has exactitude, certainty, and infallibility. 
This point is illustrated through the use of an elaborate analogy 
with the sun’s ray passing through water (according to which 
the water’s blurriness or clarity affects the ray’s visibility, but 
does not change its essence): in just the same way, the soul’s 
essence is thought to remain unaffected by matter (the body), 
and, similarly, medicine retains its credentials as a science, even 
if these credentials can be “blurred” by its preoccupation with 
matter (§§4–5). The preface concludes by urging the reader to 
keep this aspect of medicine’s essence in mind, and by saying 
that the book offers a selection of medical-naturalist problems 
that are considered useful for intellectual exercise, though not 
wholly devoid of practical use as well (§6).18 
The first question the two prefaces pose concerns their re-
lationship to the content of the respective books of problems to 
which they belong. Thus, Book 1 contains a blend of medical-
biological and naturalist problems, which are concerned with 
topics such as the causes of various physiological phenomena 
(such as laughter, sweating, paleness, tremor, yawning, vision); 
differences in physical constitution, depending on age, or gen-
der; parallel investigations of animals and humans, in terms of 
their physiological traits; the body’s humors; or the physical 
properties and efficacy of nutritional and other medicinal sub-
stances (such as wine, water, oil, mustard, and pepper). In this 
 
17 Cf. Galen UP 1.4 (III 8–9 K. = 71 M.) for the parallel idea that human 
logos (not medicine as such) allowed us to practice the arts. 
18 Practical instructions can be found e.g. in Probl. 2.9 (εἰκότως οὖν δεῖ 
τρέφειν, ἵνα ῥώσαντες τοὺς µῦς ἐξαναστήσωµεν πρὸς ἄµυναν τοῦ λυποῦντος); 
2.10 (δὸς δὲ τὴν ὕλην ἄφθονον καὶ ὄψει τὸν παροξυσµὸν ἀνενδεῆ); etc. 
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context, a preface on the method of solving such problems 
seems appropriate. However, the possibility that it was a later 
annexation cannot be excluded. Book 2, next, contains medical 
problems that are, for a considerable part, concerned with 
specific diseases (for example, probl. 1, kidney disease; probl. 2, 
4, 8, 9, περιπνευµονία; probl. 3, wasting; there are also frequent 
references to different types of fevers, as well as to bruises and 
wounds). But it also includes other topics on physics (e.g. probl. 
86, on air currents; probl. 89, on the sun; or probl. 119 and 
132, on ice and mirrors). In this context, the preface’s focus on 
medicine and its credentials as a science is apposite, because it 
underscores the author’s perception of medical problems, 
however specialist in kind, as constituting a sub-category of 
naturalist problems. Still, given that the preface makes no 
direct reference to the book’s contents (and vice versa), it is 
possible that it too was initially composed as a stand-alone 
piece which was annexed only later.19 The relationship of the 
collection’s two books to each other is also an open issue, given 
their variable contents. More systematic investigation is re-
quired, which is beyond the scope and goals of the present 
study (we defer it to the future). 
3. Intellectual background and aims 
It is quite clear that the threefold distinction of problems that 
is proposed in the preface to Book 1 has its intellectual basis in 
Aristotle’s Topics 1.10–11. There Aristotle, in discussing the 
definitions of the dialectical proposition and the dialectical 
problem, stresses that “nobody in their right mind would issue 
a proposition out of what nobody holds, or propose for solution 
what is apparent to all, or to most people. For the latter admits 
no doubt, while to the former nobody would agree” (οὐδεὶς γὰρ 
ἂν προτείνειε νοῦν ἔχων τὸ µηδενὶ δοκοῦν οὐδὲ προβάλοι τὸ πᾶσι 
φανερὸν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις· τὰ µὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ δ’ οὐδεὶς 
ἂν θείη, 104a5–8). In our text, this corresponds to the first 
 
19 Interestingly, some MSS. (L and V2b) completely omit the second 
preface. 
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category of problems, namely, those that are πιστὰ καὶ γνώριµα 
(§1), and are therefore not amenable to investigation. The third 
category of problems too, namely, those that occupy a “middle 
ground” (µέσην ἔχοντα χώραν, §13), in the sense that they are 
uncertain or ambiguous in respect of their solution, echoes 
Topics 1.11 (104b1–5, 12–17). The second type of problem 
(namely, problems whose solutions are known only to god, §7) 
does not correspond to any known formal classification of 
problems that we possess. Yet many of the examples that are 
listed are also considered typically insoluble in other sources.20 
On the whole, the preface is in tune with evidence from other 
Graeco-Roman authors as well (namely, Alexander of Aphro-
disias)21 showing that, during the imperial era, there was sys-
tematic engagement with Aristotle’s theory of problem-posing 
and problem-solving, as articulated in the dialectical works, 
towards developing a method of solving medical-naturalist 
problems in particular. 
Secondly, the wealth of examples the author provides in 
order to illustrate each respective category of problems that he 
distinguishes offer helpful clues as to the relationship of his text 
with wider problemata-literature, as well as with other traditions 
in which such subject-matter may have featured as a topic. 
Thus, the plentiful examples that he lists for problems that are 
credible and intelligible (§1) further affirm his knowledge of 
Aristotle’s zoological writings, both because of the terminology 
 
20 For the text’s connection with the paradoxographical tradition more 
generally, see Meeusen, in Medicine and Paradoxography 199–214. 
21 See In Top. 62.30–63.19, where Alexander distinguishes between 
physical problems (which are not dialectical), and dialectical problems on 
physical (besides ethical and logical) topics. See J. Mansfeld, “Physikai doxai 
and Problemata physika from Aristotle to Aëtius (and Beyond),” in W. W. For-
tenbaugh et al. (eds.), Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical, and Scientific 
Writings (London 1992) 63–111 = J. Mansfeld, “Physikai doxai and Problemata 
physika in Philosophy and Rhetoric: From Aristotle to Aëtius (and Beyond),” 
in J. Mansfeld et al. (eds.), Aëtiana III Studies in the Doxographical Traditions of 
Ancient Philosophy (Leiden 2010) 33–97; Meeusen, in Greek Medical Literature 
105 n.33. 
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that he uses (e.g. terms such as ὀστρακόδερµα, §2), and because 
of the overall teleological mindset, wherein the body parts 
listed are taken to serve a certain goal. However, the explana-
tions that he provides for the different functions of the parts in 
question only on occasion echo Aristotle. For example, the ex-
planation that feathers exist for warmth in the first instance (by 
way of clothes), and for beauty in the second, finds no parallel 
in Aristotle, for whom feathers (along with wings) exist in birds 
on account of the fact that they serve their need to fly.22 
By far the most intriguing list of examples that is provided 
concerns the problems that the author considers as “totally 
insoluble” (§7). These enquire after phenomena such as the link 
between tickling and laughter,23 hearing marbles being rubbed 
or iron being filed and gnashing of one’s teeth, the ability of 
certain stones (the magnetic stone24 and the stone called 
elektros)25 to attract other objects, the peculiar behaviour of 
certain animals,26 and, finally, the healing or purgative effects 
of various substances.27 The Stoic concepts of sympathy and 
 
22 Part.An. 694a1–5, with J. G. Lennox, Aristotle: On the Parts of Animals 
(Oxford 2001) ad loc. On the other hand, the explanation that horns and 
nails exist for the sake of protection echoes 655b1–7, 687b22–24; cf. also 
Suppl.Probl. 2.158. 
23 Cf. Arist. Part.An. 673a3–10; ps.-Arist. Probl. 35.2, 8 (964b30–32, 
965a11–32, respectively ). 
24 Arist. fr.112 Gigon (= Alex. Aphr. In Top. 63.2); Theophr. De lap. 4; 
Galen Loc.Aff. VIII 66, 422 K., SMT XI 612 K., Ther.Pis. XIV 225 K. (pro-
viding the cause). 
25 Cf. Theophr. De lap. 28 (citing Diocles: fr.239a van der Eijk); Clem. 
Alex. Strom. 2.6.26.2. 
26 Lion fearing the cock: cf. Aesop Fab. 84; Sextus Emp. Pyrrh.Hypot. 1.58; 
Aelian NA 3.31, 8.28, 9.1. Chicken cleaning itself after laying an egg: 
Theophr. fr.362A FHSG (mentioning it as an example of those things we 
cannot give the reason for, see also n.37 below). Quails feeding on helle-
bore, and starlings on hemlock: Galen Temp. I 684 K., Alim.Fac. VI 567 K., 
SMT XI 382, 551–552, 600–601, 612 K., Ther.Pis. XIV 227 K., Hipp.Epid. 
VI XVIIb 307 K. 
27 On purslane as a cure for irritated teeth: ps.-Arist. Probl. 863b11–18, 
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antipathy seem to be central to most of them, concerned as 
they are with the power of beings, objects, or substances to 
attract or repel other beings, objects, or substances. The con-
cepts are well-attested in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, 
which devotes an entire book (Book 7, 886a23–887b7) to the 
investigation of “Problems arising from Sympathy” ( Ὅσα ἐκ 
συµπαθείας). We also find them in imperial authors such as 
Plutarch and Aelian; Aelian especially (whose outlook, as Smith 
has demonstrated, is Stoic)28 widely employs them in order to 
explain natural enmities or friendships between animals. 
The author’s metaphorical language provides an important 
clue to his background and didactic aims. It is thus noteworthy 
that he compares “problems which are known only to god” (§7) 
to the mechanical creations of an artisan: both god and the 
artisan possess knowledge of hidden causes (i.e. of the precise 
mechanism behind the working of a device, and the mech-
anism behind certain physiological or natural phenomena, 
respectively) which are not accessible to a layperson. God as an 
artisan is a concept that goes back to Plato’s Timaeus (27D–
29D); in a similar vein, Aristotle in Metaphysics 7 compares the 
creations of nature to those of art (1032a20–1034a24). Con-
___ 
887b1–7; Galen SI I 75 K., Alim.Fac. VI 634 K., Comp.Med.Loc. XII 874 K. 
On its coldness see esp. Galen Temp. I 679 K., SMT XI 830–831 K. On 
κολοκυνθίς attracting phlegm, Galen Comp.Med.Loc. XII 857 K.; on ἀγαρι-
κόν attracting phlegm, Aëtius Iatricorum 3.40; Oribasius Synops. 1.17; on 
hellebore attracting phlegm, Galen Comp.Med.Loc. XII 383 K., [Int.] XIV 
757 K.; on hellebore used as a purgative when there is a lot of phlegm, 
Hippocratic corpus Aff. 20 (VI 230 L.), Mul. 16 (VIII 54 L.); Aëtius Iatricorum 
3.54 (on εὐφόρβιον); on coccus Cnidius, Hippocratic corpus Fist. 7 (VI 454 
L.), Int. 38, 51 (VII 260, 296 L.), Mul. 80 (VIII 200 L.); Galen Nat.Fac. II 42 
K., Loc.Aff. VIII 153 K., SMT XI 610–612 K., Ther.Pis. XIV 223 K. On 
epithymon and black hellebore’s power to clear black bile: Galen At.Bil. V 132 
K.; Comp.Med.Loc. XII 383 K. On scammony’s ability to attract yellow bile, 
Galen Ther.Pis. XIV 223 K., Comp.Med. Loc. XII 382 K.; on the electric ray’s 
(νάρκη) ability to cause numbness to the body, Aelian NA 1.36, 9.14. 
28 S. Smith, Man and Animal in Severan Rome: The Literary Imagination of 
Claudius Aelianus (Cambridge 2014) 100–120. 
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ceptually the metaphor also ties in closely with the idea, ex-
pressed in the Aristotelian Problemata Mechanica (848a37), that 
“Craftsmen construct a machine concealing the principle so 
that only the marvel of the mechanical device is visible, while 
the cause is unknown.” No specific examples of mechanical 
devices are provided, presumably because the reader can easily 
bring them to mind from everyday experience. When it comes 
to insoluble problems, on the other hand, abundant examples 
are cited. In this way the limits of causal investigation, when it 
comes to phenomena within the remit of natural science and 
medicine, become clearer. 
Analogy is also helpful to the author’s attempt to illustrate 
goal-oriented causation. He assimilates the animals’ horns, 
nails, and beaks to natural spears, the external hard parts of 
their bodies (scales and hides) to protective chests, the thorns of 
plants to arrows, and the flowers of plants to heralds who an-
nounce the birth of fruits. These similes clarify his teleological 
reasoning (τίνος ἕνεκεν, §2), and, at the same time, instill in his 
readers the Stoic notion of provident nature. The author wants 
his readers to take this notion for granted, as is evident from his 
dismissal of enquiries that seek to establish whether god or 
nature designed the parts of animals (§6). His use of similes 
from the realm of human experience, however, suggests that he 
does not presume familiarity with teleological reasoning on 
their part. 
Last but not least, analogy illustrates the author’s concept of 
“unsayable properties” (ἰδιότητες ἄρρητοι, §11): as he proposes, 
the phrase is akin to the term ἰδιώµατα, used by philosophers 
and grammarians (§12). The term ἰδίωµα denotes the special, 
or distinctive uses and meanings of grammatical terms. It can 
also refer to grammatical forms which are exceptions to stan-
dard grammatical rules (what we call anomalous forms), or to 
idiosyncrasies of style.29 The author’s point is that, just as 
 
29 See LSJ s.v.; also Apoll. Dysc. De constr. 2.123 (221.7–10 U., τὴν φύσει 
κτητικὴν ἀντωνυµίαν, ἰδίωµα ἔχουσαν τὸ κτῆµα), and Dion. Hal. Dem. 50.70 
(τρίτον ἔτι καὶ τέταρτον ἰδίωµα τῆς συνθέσεως τοῦ ῥήτορος ἦν τό τε ἐξαλλάτ-
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grammarians are in certain cases content to note exceptions in 
standard linguistic usage, without attempting to explain them, 
so the doctor should note certain phenomena as exceptional, in 
the sense that, in their case, standard explanations (such as 
those that attribute the purgative power of certain drugs to 
heat) prove to be inadequate or logically fallacious.30 
The phrase “unsayable properties,” ἰδιότητες ἄρρητοι, is Stoic 
in origin. As Reinhardt demonstrates, it is attested in Galen, 
who only briefly mentions it (especially in his writings on the 
pulse), but never offers a definition or typology for it. This 
suggests it was familiar to his audience.31 In contrast, the effort 
our text takes to explain the concept suggests that it does not 
presume any familiarity with it. It is also worth noting that the 
concept is akin to the way Aelian uses the adjective ἀπόρρητος 
(which usually has the stronger meaning of “secret,” but is 
etymologically linked to ἄρρητος, in that it refers to something 
that cannot or should not be expressed)32 in his zoological 
miscellany On the Characteristics of Animals. Aelian makes frequent 
use of the term to refer to phenomena and animal charac-
teristics or behaviour for which an explanation is elusive:33 for 
example, he regularly attributes inexplicable phenomena to a 
“secret nature” (φύσις ἀπόρρητος) that animals possess. Often in 
his text the term ἀπόρρητος appears next to the adjective θαυ-
µαστός. As Meeusen has argued, our text’s use of the adjective 
ἄρρητος seems to align with paradoxographical attitudes to 
nature as a source of wondrous and often inexplicable phenom-
ena (as seen in Aelian). The attitude stems from (and builds on) 
___ 
τειν παντοδαπῶς καὶ τὸ σχηµατίζειν ποικίλως τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους). 
30 On medical uses of the term ἰδίωµα see Galen Comp.Med.Loc. XIII 784 
K. (ἰδίωµα δὲ τοῦ φαρµάκου ἐπίπαγον ῥυπώδη ποιεῖν). 
31 T. Reinhardt, “Galen on Unsayable Properties,” OSAPh 40 (2011) 
297–317. See also Meeusen, in Ancient Greek Medicine in Questions and Answers 
98–99. 
32 See LSJ s.v. ἀπόρρητος II.2 (“not to be spoken, secret,” used mostly for 
sacred things) and III (ἀπορρήτως: “ineffably, inexpressibly”). 
33 E.g. 1.18, 1.35, 2.22, 2.48, 4.10, 4.29, 4.41, 5.33, 5.40, 5.49, 6.60, 9.17. 
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statements found in both Aristotle and Theophrastus that the 
investigation of nature inspires wonder in the scientist.34 
The hypothesis of a Galenic backdrop (and therefore of a 
post-Galenic date) is supported by the fact that, especially for 
the pharmacological substances that are listed under the same 
category, most parallels can be found in Galen’s pharmaco-
logical and dietetical treatises (On Simple Drugs and On the Com-
position of Drugs according to Places). Galen might well have been 
the direct source for these examples, even though he himself 
never groups these substances under the concept of the “unsay-
able properties” (this is a unique connection made by our text). 
At any rate, the preface criticises the solutions of those who do 
attempt to solve such problems as “endless” (ἀπειροτάτας, §11)35 
and “improbable” (ἀπιθάνους, §11), and attacks the logical 
fallacy that typically underpins them (for example, the fact that 
they presume that drugs can purge by virtue of being warm, 
when in fact warmth does not necessitate the power to purge, 
as in the example of pepper and other substances). It is not 
clear what sorts of adversaries the author might have in mind: 
the many parallels found in other ancient texts suggest that 
such problems constituted common subjects of enquiry across 
various kinds of medical-naturalist literature. It is however 
likely that his criticism may in part be directed against Peri-
patetic, or Peripatetic-inspired, problemata-writing, as some types 
of problems that he cites occur in texts such as the pseudo-
Aristotelian collection of Problemata. Problema 35.8 is such an 
example: it seeks to explain why we laugh especially when we 
are scratched in the armpits; according to the answer, this is 
caused by a sudden exit of breath, a result, in turn, of heating 
in the region scratched. Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias, in 
his commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, cites the problem “Why 
 
34 See Meeusen, in Medicine and Paradoxography 205–206. On nature as a 
source of wonder cf. Arist. Part.An. 645a17–25; Theophr. Caus.Pl. 2.17.1; 
ps.-Arist. Virt. et vit. 1250b29–32; and the pseudo-Aristotelian paradoxo-
graphical collection of Mir. ( passim). 
35 If we adopt this reading of branch β of the MSS. 
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does the so-called magnetic stone attract iron?” as an example 
of a “physical problem whose cause is unknown,” according to 
a definition of φυσικὰ προβλήµατα purportedly offered by Ari-
stotle’s now lost [Περὶ] Προβληµάτων (fr.112 Gigon).36 If so, this 
further underscores our text’s independent approach to solving 
medical-naturalist problems. However, its claim about causal 
unknowability may also have more general methodological im-
plications, serving as a direct criticism of people in general (not 
just Peripetatics) who set no formal limits to their research 
agenda, since they do not acknowledge their intellectual limita-
tions, in comparison to god. Notably, some problems were 
considered insoluble also by the early Peripatetics (for instance, 
Theophrastus mentions the chicken cleaning itself after laying 
an egg as an example of “those things we cannot give the 
reason for”).37 
Finally, as regards the category of medical-naturalist prob-
lems that the author believes are ambiguous in terms of their 
solution (§13), the preface first seeks to define them and sub-
sequently offers specific guidelines for their solution. Analogies 
once more prove helpful: problems which are self-evident are 
like false words: in both cases, everybody recognises them as 
such; problems which are insoluble are like true words (§14). 
This at first glance awkward analogy is best understood by 
focusing on the use of πάντῃ: according to the author, what is 
considered true is something that has been proven “in every 
respect”; in a similar fashion (in fact, through antithetical 
reasoning), insoluble problems are hidden “in every respect.” 
Finally, those problems which occupy the middle ground, as it 
were, are akin to words which contain a blend of truth and 
falsity. It is this category of problems that our author is con-
cerned with. Specifically, he recommends that the solutions of 
such problems be based on aspects such as the constitution, 
 
36 See also n.24 above. 
37 Fr.362A.20 FHSG: ὧν οὐκ ἔχοµεν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι. See Meeusen, in 
Medicine and Paradoxography 209. 
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form, activity, affinity (συµπάθεια), colour, deception caused by 
our senses, or equivocality (ὁµωνυµία), the greater or lesser de-
gree of a body’s (or substance’s) active powers, or its texture 
(harder or looser), other attributes such as quantity, age, or 
custom, and, finally, on whether a body changes or is affected 
in terms of its essence, or accidents (§15). The meaning of all is 
straightforward,38 and all pertain to the doctors’ method of 
knowing things through their senses and intellect. 
Platonism appears to be an important intellectual influence 
in the second preface, with its strong emphasis on the biparti-
tion of body and soul. Especially the analogy that is constructed 
between the purity of the soul and the clear ray of light that 
penetrates water or is (temporarily, but not essentially) ob-
scured by a cloud (§4) hints at a Neoplatonic background. The 
closest parallel is found in the fifth Ennead of Plotinus, also in 
the form of an analogy: as Plotinus points out, “As the rays of 
the sun light up a dark cloud and give it a golden look, so soul 
entering into a body of heaven gives it life and gives it immor-
tality and wakes what lies inert”39 (οἷον σκοτεινὸν νέφος ἡλίου 
βολαὶ φωτίσασαι λάµπειν ποιοῦσι χρυσοειδῆ ὄψιν διδοῦσαι, οὕτω 
τοι καὶ ψυχὴ ἐλθοῦσα εἰς σῶµα οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκε µὲν ζωήν, ἔδωκε δὲ 
ἀθανασίαν, ἤγειρε δὲ κείµενον, 5.1.2). The imagery of the sun re-
curs throughout the Enneads, particularly in the second (cosmo-
logical) one. There, Plotinus stresses that the “pure soul” (ψυχὴ 
καθαρά) partakes of the sun (which itself has a dual nature, like 
the material and pure soul).40 
 
38 Equivocality (ὁµωνυµία) is perhaps the least straightforward among 
them, yet well-attested in Galen, who uses it to refer to doctors’ confusing 
use of a single name (such as “the hot,” τὸ θερµόν) to refer to different things 
(elements, qualities, powers, or even concrete objects, or bodies); see Hipp. 
Elem. I 457 ff. K. On Galen’s views on semantic ambiguity and their intel-
lectual backdrop see R. Blair Edlow, Galen on Language and Ambiguity (Leiden 
1977) 9–68; B. Morrison, “Logic,” in R. J. Hankinson (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Galen (Cambridge 2008) 66–115. 
39 Transl. A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus V (Cambridge [Mass.] 1984). 
40 Enn. 2.3.9; cf. 2.1.7, commenting on Pl. Ti. 39B. See K. Corrigan, 
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The second preface’s approach to the relationship between 
soul and matter (body) should be compared to Galen’s views on 
the question, as expressed particularly in the treatise The Soul’s 
Traits Depend on Bodily Temperament (QAM IV 767–821 K.). 
There, Galen enquires how far the different parts of the soul 
depend on and suffer changes according to the humoral mix-
tures (κράσεις) of the body. His answer to this question is posi-
tive, and supported by critical doxography which cites Plato, 
Aristotle, Hippocratic treatises, and Stoic positions. Galen is 
however sceptical about the Platonic position that the soul is 
distinct from the body, in terms of its substance (775–779). He 
remains undecided on the question of what substance the soul 
consists of, but his personal observations convince him that, 
whatever the case, “it is itself a slave to the krasias [sic] of the 
body” (779).41 The second preface’s outright rejection of the 
views of those who believe that the soul is “corruptible, and 
suffused by the affections of matter” (§3) may well have Galen’s 
views in mind.42 If so, this provides an argument for a post-
Galenic date in this instance as well. 
The author’s aim in the second preface is to rehabilitate 
medicine as a science. The phrasing used speaks of a clear per-
ception in the author’s mind of a distinction between technê and 
epistêmê. This author clearly draws on a Peripatetic background, 
in attempting to establish medicine’s status as a science: the 
claim that medicine is akin to philosophy, whose end it has set 
as its own proper beginning (φιλοσοφίας γὰρ φέρει τὰ γνωρίσµα-
___ 
“Essence and Existence in the Enneads,” in L. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge 1996) 105–129; J. Wilberding, Plotinus’ Cos-
mology: A Study of Ennead II.1 (40) (Oxford 2006) 70, 214–218. 
41 Transl. I. Johnston, Galen: On Temperaments. On Non-Uniform Distemper-
ment. The Soul’s Traits Depend on Bodily Temperament (Cambridge [Mass.] 2020). 
42 By contrast, cf. Probl. 1.26 for “a grossly materialistic conception of the 
soul”: Sharples, BICS 48 (2005) 54. Cf. Flashar, Hermes 90 (1962) 409 n.3 
(see also n.1 above). Our author does not/no longer uphold(s) this materi-
alistic view in the second preface, which may indicate either his philosophi-
cal ambivalence/inconsistency on the matter or the detachedness of the 
second preface from the actual collection of problems. 
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τα, ἧς τὸ τέλος οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν παρεπήξατο, §2), followed up by the 
assertion that it “does not lie outside naturalist contemplation” 
(τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας ἐκτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, §2), is likely an allusion to 
Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia, where Aristotle claims that naturalist 
investigation and medicine overlap up to a certain extent, with 
medicine beginning where philosophy left off, and philosophy 
concluding with the principles of natural science.43 Further, the 
author’s agenda of rehabilitating medical problems by treating 
them as integral parts of philosophical enquiry probably also 
looks back to the pseudo-Aristotelian collection of Problemata, 
whose own blend of naturalist and medical subject-matter has 
been interpreted in terms of a similar concern (even though this 
is not openly proclaimed).44 
The author’s approach finds parallels in Galen’s treatise On 
the Constitution of the Art of Medicine, addressed to Patrophilus. 
There, Galen explains that medicine is a productive art (ποιη-
τικὴ τέχνη), in the sense that “you can in fact show the result of 
the art when the practice of it stops” (I 229 K.):45 unlike other 
productive arts (such as building), however, it cannot build a 
body from scratch, but only deals with the restoration of a body 
that already exists. Like all other classes of art, and in accor-
 
43 Sens. 1, 436a20–b2; Resp. 480b22–31. See K. Oikonomopoulou, “The 
Problemata’s Medical Books: Structural and Methodological Aspects,” in The 
Aristotelian Problemata Physica 61–78, at 64–65. 
44 The medical penchant of the Aristotelian Probl. is clear, especially in 
the first book (entitled Ὅσα ἰατρικά). See A. Ulacco, “Malattia e alterazione 
del calore naturale: medicina ippocratica e fisiologia aristotelica negli hosa 
iatrika e in altri Problemata pseudo-aristotelici,” in Studi sui Problemata Physica 
aristotelici 59–88; R. Mayhew, “Aristotle on Fever in Problemata I,” Apeiron 48 
(2015) 176–194; Oikonomopoulou, in The Aristotelian Problemata Physica 61–
78; M. Meeusen, “ ‘Why Do Massages Produce Flesh?’: A Case of Textual 
Reuse in the Aristotelian Natural Problems (37.3),” in V. Nutton et al. (eds.), 
Ancient Medicine, Behind and Beyond Hippocrates: Essays in Honour of Elizabeth 
Craik = Technai 11 (2020) 203–216. 
45 Transl. I. Johnston, Galen. On the Constitution of the Art of Medicine. The Art 
of Medicine. A Method of Medicine to Glaucon (Cambridge [Mass.] 2016). 
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dance with philosophical definitions of what an art is (227),46 
medicine has an end result (τέλος), and this is no other than the 
maintenance of the body’s health (229–230). For this to be 
achieved, the doctor must have precise knowledge (ἀκριβῶς 
γνῶναι, 231) of the functions of all individual body parts, just as 
the practitioners of other productive arts such as building know 
precisely the parts that a house consists of. The second preface 
too defines the σκοπός of medicine as directed to the ensouled 
body (§1), and stresses the importance of ἀκρίβεια in medicine’s 
method (§3). Its statements that “medicine does not neglect the 
soul” (§2) and that “it partakes of philosophy’s goal” (τέλος, §2) 
are moreover consistent with Galenic positions, as attested in 
his psychological works and in his treatise The Best Doctor is also 
a Philosopher. Where it departs from Galen’s classification of the 
arts in this treatise at least47 is in its insistence that medicine is 
related to natural science (τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας ἐκτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν). 
As we saw above, this hints at a Peripatetic approach to med-
icine’s relationship to natural philosophy. 
This blend of a Platonist theological background with a Peri-
patetic approach to medicine as a discipline which overlaps 
with natural science makes this preface stand out. 
4. Rhetorical texture 
Both prefaces are rhetorically polished compositions. They 
explain their terms, illustrate them with examples and gloss 
them with metaphors and similes (on which see above, section 
3). Moreover, they put emphasis on key points through the 
clever use of rhetorical tropes such as rhetorical questions (1.1–
2), polysyndeton (note the repetition of δέ… in 1.1–4 and 1.9; 
 
46 As Johnston, Galen. On the Constitution of the Art of Medicine 19 n.5, notes, 
Galen probably has Aristotle Met. 2, 994b9–996a24, in mind. 
47 But cf. Galen’s statement (Opt.Med. I 61 K.) that the best doctor has 
knowledge of all parts of philosophy: “the logical, the physical and the 
ethical” (πάντα δὴ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔχει τὰ µέρη, τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν 
καὶ τὸ ἠθικόν), transl. P. Singer, Galen: Selected Works (Oxford 1997). Galen’s 
reference to the “natural part” (τὸ φυσικὸν) implies that medicine relies (at 
least in part) on natural science. 
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or the repetition of ἤ…-questions in 1.8 and of the disjunctive ἤ 
in 1.15), anaphora (note the repetition of πρώτως in 2.5: αὐτὴ 
γὰρ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν πρώτως ἔχει τὸ βέβαιον, πρώτως ἔχει τὸ ἑδραῖον 
καὶ ἅπτωτον), isocolon and paronomasia (πάντῃ … κεκτηµένα, 
πάντῃ … κεκρυµµένα, 1.14). Furthermore, antithesis plays a 
significant role in the rhetorical layout of the first preface, built 
upon the contraposition between problems that are too easy to 
solve (§1) and too difficult (§7). To this end, the preface also 
uses the tricolon (πεζοῖς δὲ ζῴοις τρίχας, ἑρπετοῖς δὲ φολίδας, 
ἐνύδροις δὲ λεπίδας, ἢ ὄστρακα, καθάπερ τὰ ὀστρακόδερµα προσ-
αγορευόµενα, §2). Other examples of antithesis include, again 
with tricolon, 1.6 (ὅσοι µέν … ὅσοι δέ … ὅσοι δέ), with enumeratio 
(τὴν τάξιν, τὴν κίνησιν, τὴν θέσιν, τὴν διάπλασιν, τὰς χρόας); or the 
parallelisms in 1.14 (ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν λεγοµένων … τὸν αὐτὸν τρό-
πον καὶ τῶν προβαλλοµένων), with symmetrical collocation of the 
participles at the end of each colon (τὰ µέν … πᾶσι γνωριζόµενα, 
τὰ δὲ πάντῃ … κεκτηµένα, τὰ δὲ … κεκραµένα λεγόµενα—note 
also the etymological figura with variatio πᾶσι/πάντῃ). The 
second preface too makes ample use of antithesis, by employing 
the contrastives µὲν/δὲ (τὰ µὲν καλῶς προµηθευθέντα φυλάσσει 
χρηστῶς, τὰ δὲ ἐλλιπῶς κατασκευασθέντα διορθοῦται, §3), and 
also by drawing stark contrasts between the human and divine 
dimension, the (immaterial) soul and the (material) body. 
Both prefaces contain vivid natural imagery, appealing to the 
reader’s senses: the first preface’s abundant examples (§§2–5, 
8–10) invite the reader to imagine the colours, shapes, sounds, 
tastes, and textures of the animals, plants, or inanimate objects 
that are found in nature, towards understanding what natural 
philosophy and medicine can contribute to their investigation; 
in the second preface too, the striking images of the sun’s ray 
that immerses itself in water and of the sun’s brilliance that is 
hidden behind a cloud (§4) exploit the reader’s visual faculty in 
order to make a philosophical point about the soul’s purity 
(and, by analogy, about medicine’s ‘purity’ as a science). 
Last but not least, both prefaces build a communicative 
framework which is pedagogical on the one hand and polemi-
cal on the other. As regards their pedagogy, it is notable that in 
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the first preface the author switches from the first person 
singular at the beginning of his text to the first person plural 
towards its end. His use of οἶµαι in §1, followed by his direct 
address to his intended reader in §11 (µυρίων ἄν σοι τοιούτων 
προκαταβαλοίµην κατάλογον) underscores his authoritative role 
as a teacher-instructor of medicine and a natural scientist, who 
undertakes the task of introducing his recipient to his recom-
mended method of solving medical and naturalist problems. 
Once he has expounded this method, his use of the first person 
plural in §13 (ὧν καὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ποιησόµεθα) and §17 (ἀρξόµεθα 
τῶν λύσεων) serves as a marker of his gradual transition to the 
main body of his text, which, as he makes clear, will be con-
cerned with problems which occupy the middle ground. The 
reader has by now received sufficient instruction so as to ac-
tively engage with the individual problems that are to follow, so 
the use of the first person plural may well signal the joint effort 
(of author and reader) that will be involved in their solution. 
The author of the second preface, on the other hand, uses the 
first person plural exclusively: first in the context of urging that 
“we think about medicine in the same way as we have decreed 
about the soul” (ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔγνωµεν, οὕτω νοήσωµεν καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, §5); and, later on, in his transition to the main 
body of problems that will comprise the second book of the 
Medical Puzzles, explaining that he has [“we have”] gathered 
problems mainly for the purpose of theoretical enquiry, and 
secondarily for practical benefit (§6). Both uses may once again 
be interpreted as an invitation to his readers to share his con-
clusions (about the status of medicine as a science) and treat the 
problems that will follow as suitable training-ground for their 
own theoretical study of medicine. This is made clear through 
the author’s reference, using the third person, to those who will 
gain a theoretical benefit from the study of medicine. 
The first preface frequently refers to “those who [believe/ 
attempt]…” (ὅσοι…), using the third person (§§6, 11–12). The 
judgmental tone of such references is part of the author’s 
polemical strategy, which criticises other approaches to posing 
and solving natural and medical problems on the one hand, 
and defends his own methodology on the other. As expected, 
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his criticism is directed particularly at those who attempt to 
solve the first two classes of problems. He characterises those 
who attempt to solve problems which are well-known as devoid 
of reason or sense perception. In even starker terms, those who 
put the very existence of natural providence into question are 
deemed worthy of punishment. Even though he does not name 
these opponents, as we saw above (section 3) they may well 
include natural philosophers and doctors belonging to the Peri-
patetic tradition, but the criticism may also be directed more 
generally at people who do not delimit their research project. 
In similarly dismissive terms, the solutions of those who pose 
insoluble problems are criticised as fanciful or absurd (ἀπειρο-
τάτας, ἀπιθάνους, ἄτοπον, §§11–12). In a comparable fashion, 
the second preface forestalls objections to its author’s defence 
of medicine as an exact science: “should anybody venture to 
call it [sc. medicine] art” (§3), they may only do so insofar as 
they refer to the matter with which medicine is concerned (and 
not to medicine’s essence). This position is predicated on the 
author’s alignment with “most philosophers” (πολλοῖς τῶν φιλο-
σόφων, §3) who treat the soul as immortal (as opposed to those 
who claim the opposite, φασί, §3). 
Taken together, these aspects point to both prefaces’ links to 
an oral context of medical problem-posing and problem-
solving. As Nutton has pointed out, we have epigraphical evi-
dence from Ephesus that the πρόβληµα was a distinct discipline 
in the medical competitions held in the city during the festival 
of Asclepius in the imperial period (the other disciplines being 
σύνταγµα, ὄργανον, χειρουργία).48 An agonistic setting of similar 
type may explain the prefaces’ polemic tone and defence of 
medicine’s credentials and distinctive method of problem-
solving. Their didacticism builds on this background, develop-
ing a method of medical problem-solving that has already been 
presented (and defended) in a public agonistic setting. 
 
48 V. Nutton, Ancient Medicine (London 2013 [2004]) 216 n.72, citing 
I.Ephesos 1161–1169. Cf. Meeusen, in Ancient Greek Medicine in Questions and 
Answers 100–101. 
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The prefaces to the two books present considerable similari-
ties in intellectual outlook, even though we cannot be certain 
that they were written by a single author. Both exhibit knowl-
edge of Platonic theological thought, acquaintance with Stoic 
concepts and Peripatetic dialectic, and familiarity with Galen’s 
pharmacological works and Aristotle’s zoological treatises. In 
addition, both take into account a wide range of naturalist 
writings, including problemata-literature. Together, they offer a 
well-developed theory of problem-posing and problem-solving 
specifically tailored for medical-naturalist problems, as well as a 
self-conscious agenda of rehabilitating medicine as a science. 
The prefaces seek to promote study of medical-naturalist prob-
lems as a subject worthy of intellectual exercise, but also with a 
practical value. Judging by the abundance of examples and 
language, they are directed at pupils of medicine, who might 
require illustration when it comes to concepts such as teleo-
logical causation, and seek to instill in them fundamental prin-
ciples, such as the division of body and soul, and the notion of 
the provident god. They thus illustrate how valuable medical-
naturalist problemata-literature was deemed to be in the imperial 
era as a tool for instilling basic intellectual principles as well as 
a sense of professional identity in the pupils of medicine, as 
practitioners of a science proper. 
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